Fortra Intelligence and Research Experts (FIRE) are tracking targeted, large-scale email attacks dubbed “mail bombing,” followed immediately by IT support impersonation on Microsoft Teams. In the attacks, individual users are being flooded with email, then contacted by the threat actor through Teams as the volume peaks. In the calls, the threat actors are claiming to be representatives from Internal IT, providing the user both verbal and email instructions they claim will stop the flood, but in reality attempting to compromise the user account, system, or both.
What is Mail Bombing
Mail bombing deliberately floods an inbox with unwanted messages. The most common form is subscription bombing, where attackers submit a target email address to newsletter, registration, and other signup forms across unrelated websites. Legitimate services then send welcome messages, confirmation requests, and account notifications to that address.
Mail bombing does not require access to the target mailbox. A form using double opt-in can still contribute to a confirmation email before the recipient approves the subscription. Without confirmation requirements, some subscriptions may continue generating mail after the initial burst.
Campaign Overview
In the attacks observed so far by the FIRE team, the average email delivery of a mail bombing attack is at a peak of 10k messages per active campaign, around 1k emails per day.
Intelligence and indicators highlight these attacks are likely an AI Agent setup, where the agent is instructed to crawl every webpage available for newsletter subscription boxes, as well as demo / prospecting-based forms and add the target email.
In the activity we reviewed, Mailchimp and its transactional service, Mandrill, were the most frequently observed delivery services, followed by Amazon SES and SendGrid. A range of other domains are used, which likely manage their newsletters directly on their infrastructure.
Suspected Phishing Attempts - Hiding the Needle in the Haystack
FIRE has detected phishing during these mail-bombing waves. The associated phishing page used fake validation steps and loading screens to make the interaction look credible.
A phishing message can be harder to notice among large volumes of otherwise legitimate notifications. FIRE cannot verify that the bombing operator sent the observed phish in these attacks or that they were connected to the Teams activity, although they did occur concurrently. At the time of writing, both the Teams call and phishing email provide separate, observed examples of how a flood can support deceptive contact.
Why the sequence works and Impact
The attack borrows trust from normal workplace behavior:
Legitimate mail. The subscription messages come from real services and may pass authentication checks.
A real problem. The user is already dealing with disruption and wants the flood to stop.
A familiar channel. Teams is where employees expect colleagues and support staff to contact them.
Perfect timing. The caller arrives when the pressure is highest and knows exactly what the user is seeing.
Together, they create a convincing vishing pretext. The attacker is not simply hiding one message among thousands; they are creating the incident and then attempting to own the response.
The flood can interrupt customer service and routine correspondence. Staff must spend time separating useful mail from subscription traffic. Email-to-workflow functionality such as email-to-case can also turn the flood into large numbers of tickets, as well as any equivalent workflows.
Mail bombing can also obscure account alerts, payment notifications, or other messages that require attention. These need to be located and reviewed during cleanup, so an important notification is not lost with unwanted mail.
The intent can be to disrupt, deliver phishing by sneaking it through the massive wave of “legitimate” newsletter notifications, as well as create noise for an account/system takeover.
Mail Bombing Detection Challenges
An individual subscription email can look entirely normal. It may contain no malicious attachment or link. It can also pass SPF, DKIM and DMARC because it was genuinely sent by the organization named in the message.
Detection needs to consider the activity across the recipient's inbox. Look for an unusual rise in volume from unrelated senders alongside repeated signup language. Mailing-list headers such as List-Unsubscribe can help identify this traffic, but legitimate business mail also uses them.
Allowlist exceptions can make containment harder when they cover delivery platforms carrying the flood. Review those exceptions for the affected recipient. Blocking a provider across the organisation can disrupt unrelated customer and vendor communications.
How Security Teams can Respond to the Flood and the Follow-up
Treat an unexpected Teams support approach during a mail flood as part of the same investigation. Reducing inbox volume restores usability, but the user also needs a trusted way to verify anyone offering help.
Verify support independently. End unsolicited support contact and use the organization's established helpdesk route. Do not use contact details supplied by the caller. Include this scenario in user guidance: someone who knows about the flood has not proved they are IT.
Preserve evidence before cleanup. Keep representative messages with full headers, the external account details, chat and call identifiers, and a timeline from the user. Collect available email, Teams, identity and endpoint records. Review any actions taken during the interaction rather than assuming compromise from the call alone.
Contain mail for the affected recipient. Use temporary, recipient-scoped controls based on the observed traffic, with review and expiry. Check relevant allowlist exceptions and review held messages for business mail. Broad blocks on shared delivery platforms can disrupt unrelated correspondence.
Review Teams external access. Check both organization settings and the policies assigned to users. Restrict external domains where business requirements permit, and review suspicious accounts or tenants identified in the incident. Domain restrictions alone cannot address every compromised partner account. [2]
Check for activity hidden by the flood. Review delivered, junk and quarantined messages for phishing and important account or transaction notifications. Where the user acted on instructions, inspect the corresponding sign-in, session and endpoint activity. Search beyond the subscription subjects used to contain the flood.
Reduce continuing subscription traffic. Timely response is the essence; a quick response will potentially stop any disruption and increase visibility for the attack. Send representative abuse reports to the relevant services and ask which recipient-specific controls they can apply. For organizations operating signup forms, combine confirmed opt-in with rate limits and controls on repeated confirmation requests.
The Teams call explains why this activity deserves attention beyond spam cleanup. The caller used an overwhelmed inbox to make a fake support approach relevant. During a mail-bombing incident, investigate who contacts the user next and verify any proposed fix through a trusted internal route.
Mitigation Guidance for Security Teams
Start with controls scoped to the affected mailboxes, then adjust them as new sender and subject patterns appear:
Monitor volume per recipient against the normal baseline. Investigate bursts involving many unrelated senders, subscription wording, and mailing-list headers.
Temporarily quarantine matching traffic for affected recipients. Use subject and body patterns, review relevant allowlist exceptions, and give emergency rules an expiry. Check for business mail caught by those controls.
Preserve representative messages with full headers before bulk removal. Search delivered, junk and quarantined mail for important notifications and review related account activity.
Submit samples to the mail security vendors and delivery providers involved. Ask the sending businesses to remove unauthorized subscriptions and confirm which recipient-specific protection the provider can apply.
Protect email-to-case workflows with a controlled pause, a recovery process, and an alternative route for urgent requests. Review held mail before resuming normal processing.
Security teams should also confirm the scope and duration directly with the provider. During FIRE’s investigation, Mailchimp advised that senders could request temporary subscription blocking for a specified recipient. Mailchimp also documents a separate automatic control that restricts an address from joining additional audiences for 24 hours after rapid repeated signups. That control concerns Mailchimp audience signups, meaning protection across Mandrill senders needs to be confirmed separately.
For organisations operating signup forms, apply rate limits and bot controls alongside confirmed opt-in. Limit repeated confirmation requests to the same address. Double opt-in helps prevent continuing subscriptions, but the confirmation process itself also needs protection from abuse.
How Fortra Can Help
Mail bombing demonstrates why organizations need to look beyond individual messages and consider the broader context surrounding an attack. Fortra’s email security and threat protection capabilities help detect phishing and other suspicious activity that can be obscured by high-volume email, giving security teams greater visibility into potential threats and helping protect users from the compromise attackers are ultimately trying to achieve.